


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
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CAMBODIA: The Khmer insurgents are keeping up their harassment of government positions along major highways and near the Mekong River. In the most significant ground action over the weekend, insurgent attacks forced government troops to withdraw from their positions at Angtassom, about 40 miles south of Phnom Penh. Angtassom's former defenders have fallen back toward nearby Takeo. Other insurgent attacks were reported against government units along Route 2 north of Takeo, Route 15 north of Neak Luong, and Route 5 south of Kompong Chhnang. In addition, the insurgents have stalled the government clearing operation on Route 1 southeast of Phnom Penh.

The insurgents also shelled five ships of a Mekong resupply convoy, inflicting minor damage on three of them. Two of the vessels delivered badly needed petroleum products to Phnom Penh. The remaining 12 vessels in the convoy, including five carrying additional petroleum supplies, have been temporarily held up by South Vietnamese authorities at the convoy staging base at Tan Chau because of the poor security conditions along the river. If these vessels do not reach Phnom Penh today, the capital's stocks of some essential POL products will be exhausted.

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USSR-SWEDEN-FINLAND: Visits by Soviet leaders last week left some important bilateral issues unresolved.

Soviet Premier Kosygin's five-day visit to Sweden, although marred by incidents, was a modest success compared to his Stockholm trip on the eve of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Jewish and Baltic emigre demonstrators frustrated Soviet hopes to make last week's countryside tour a public relations showcase. Similarly, Kosygin became abrupt when answering nettlesome questions at his press conference. His talks with Prime Minister Palme on political issues reportedly went well, however. No abrasive statements regarding the US were made after the talks.

Economic relations were the "more important" side of the high-level talks, according to a Soviet official. As expected, the Swedes complained that Soviet imports of Swedish goods dropped sharply over the past two years, creating a substantial trade imbalance. In response, the Soviets made plain their lack of interest in expanding small-scale, cash-and-carry imports from Sweden. The Swedes were told that they would have to put bilateral economic relations on a relatively long-term basis and extend more credit. The two did agree to open negotiations next month on Soviet provision of uranium enrichment services to Sweden.

Soviet President Podgorny's five-day state visit to Finland was highlighted by commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the Finno-Soviet Friendship Treaty. The Finns had hoped for a further reading of Moscow's attitude on Helsinki's proposed free-trade agreement with the EC, and Podgorny had several hours of private talks with Finnish President Kekkonen. Neither Podgorny's speech nor the joint communiqué indicated that Soviet reservations have been dropped.

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UN - SOUTH-WEST AFRICA: Secretary-General Waldheim will meet this week with South African Foreign Minister Muller in a final effort to advance their talks on the future of South-West Africa.

The Security Council authorized Waldheim last December to continue negotiating the long-standing dispute over South African control of the territory. Waldheim's mandate expires at the end of this month, and it is unlikely that the Security Council will renew it unless some progress can be reported.

The Council will probably not consider the issue until after the OAU takes up the matter early next month. A negative report from Waldheim would intensify OAU opposition to a renewal of his mandate.

According to a UN official, South Africa has shown no serious intent to prepare the territory for independence in accordance with the criteria laid down by the Security Council last December. In particular, Pretoria appears determined to proceed with its policy of separate development for the territory's 12 ethnic groups instead of building the foundations of a unitary state. Although Prime Minister Vorster inaugurated an advisory council for the whole territory in late March, its first session indicated that it is tightly controlled by Pretoria.

Last week Muller implied to the US ambassador in Pretoria that popular elections would be held in the territory, possibly in August or September. Each ethnic group apparently would elect representatives to sit on the advisory council. This scheme may be only a slight modification of Pretoria's plan for separate development, which is intended only to deflect international pressures.

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
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If the UN - South Africa dialogue is broken off, there will be intense pressure in the UN for more stringent measures against South Africa. At that point the US and other Security Council members might be faced with proposals for punitive and enforcement actions against South Africa. A negative US stand on such proposals might well prompt Black African states to withhold support for US positions on upcoming issues such as Korea and terrorism.



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NOTE

USSR: The semiannual rotation of Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean is under way. The initial contingent of the relief force, consisting of at least four F-class diesel attack submarines and a J-class cruise missile unit from the Northern Fleet, began entering the Mediterranean [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The number of Soviet submarines in the Mediterranean will remain high--about 17--for several days until the turnover has been completed.

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